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Abstract  
The UK banking industry has steadily moved from the traditional role of financial 
intermediation and is increasingly relying on non-traditional business activities that generate 
fee income, dealings profit and other types of noninterest income. Using the dataset of large 
British Banks for the period 1986-2012, this study investigates the changes in the bank income 
structure as a result of the 1986 deregulation and tease out the effect that these changes have 
had in relation to systemic risk. On a micro analysis, larger banks are more able to sustain high 
levels of noninterest income. Among the banks Lloyds and HSBC stand out as the major players 
in noninterest income generation. At aggregate level while interest income reflects a stable 
trend, we find a significant upward but slightly volatile trend in noninterest income for the 
 period 1999-2008 before a sharp downturn induced by the financial crisis. This paper argues 
that in terms of financial stability, the banks’ greater reliance on noninterest income particularly 
commission income is associated with higher systemic risk. This study has shown that there is 
a positive correlation between interest income and non-interest income for the five banks.  
Keywords: Interest income, Non-interest income, Traditional banking, Deregulation 
diversification, Risk, bank stability, Correlation  JEL Codes: G2, G21, and G24  
  
Introduction  
Traditionally the business of banking has been to accept deposits from customers and use these 
deposits to fund loans that they kept on their balance sheets until maturity. However due 
financial regulation that took place in the eighties, the UK banking system faced major changes 
in the form of increased competition, concentration and restructuring. In the context of these 
changes which had an impact on both the bank balance sheet and the income statements and in 
response to these changes, banks widened the range of products that banks offer to their 
customers. With regard to these changes, although the interest margin banks earn by 
intermediating between depositors and borrowers continues to be a source of profits for most 
banks, they also earn substantial amounts of noninterest income by charging their customers 
fees in exchange for a variety of financial services (DeYoung and Rice, 2004).  
While these changing trends may be indicating this as a new development, banks have 
traditionally undertaken these activities even before the 1986 deregulation (Smith and Wood, 
2003). However, the radical deregulation reform that became known as ‘Big Bang’ marked the 
beginning of fundamental changes for the UK banking industry by removing numerous 
restrictions on financial service providers. In relation to these changes, while UK banks have 
been shifting away from lending activities and towards broader financial services for decades, 
the 1986 deregulation opened the way for full financial integration by explicitly allowing 
financial banks to engage in a host of new activities. In the context of the changing banking 
environment, banks generate substantial amounts of non-interest income from non-traditional 
activities such as investment banking, securities brokerage, insurance agency and underwriting 
(Kwast, 1989; Uppal, 2011).   
However, engaging in other "non-traditional" financial activities does not only give a promise 
for greater profitability, but also increases the industry’s vulnerability to systemic risk. As 
indicated by Davies and Tuori (2000) the debates on the changes in the nature of financial 
intermediation have been mostly based on theoretical and anecdotal bases rather than empirical 
evidence. While several studies have examined a similar question for US commercial banks 
and Europe, this is the first paper to empirically examine the changing income trends in UK 
banks. By way interest income and noninterest income trends analysis for 5 large UK banks for 
the period 1986-2012, this paper explores the banks’ shift from the traditional banking activities 
to the non-traditional banking activities using 1986 as the base year as it is after the 
implementation of reforms that the transformation in the bank income structure became more 
apparent. This article is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a brief account of related 
studies while section 3 presents data and methodology. In section 4 and 4.1 an empirical 
 analysis of the interest income and noninterest income trends of all the 5 banks is presented. 
Section 4.2 analyses the individual bank trends and compare them to the general view while 
section 5 presents the correlation results between interest and non-interest income. Finally 
section 6 summarizes our findings and their implications before presenting a conclusion.   
Related studies   
Over the past two decades there has been a substantial increase in studies investigating the 
combination of traditional and non-traditional banking activities. Despite the increase, earlier 
work on the decline of traditional banking has taken various approaches. The existing literature 
which is mostly based on US and in some cases on a broad set of European banks have 
predominantly focused on potential diversification benefits as the main reason why banks 
engage in a broader scope of activities. However, these studies have provided mixed results. 
While Eisemann (1976), Brewer (1989) and Stiroh (2002), Boyd et al, (1980) Kwast (1989) 
and Gallo et al, (2002) have indicated substantial benefits from diversification into non-bank 
activities, others have focused on the implications for stability and regulatory policy (see 
Edwards and Mishkin, 1995, Lui, 2012). Another cluster of research has however reported no 
benefits or even an increase in risk when banks combine traditional and non-traditional 
activities( see Stiroh and Rumble,2006; Boyd and Graham, 1986). Boyd and Graham (1986) 
found that expansion by bank holding companies into non-traditional; banking activities 
increased the risk of failures during less stringent policy periods in the 1970s. In the same 
context Demsetz and Strahan (1995) also indicate that no risk reduction was observed as banks 
tended to move to riskier activities to lower their capital ratios.   
DeYoung and Roland (2001) in their study on non-interest income and financial performance 
at US commercial banks found that fee-based activities increase the volatility of bank revenues. 
These findings are also similar to the work of Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) who 
not only show that non-interest income is more volatile but argue that it is also increasingly 
correlated with interest income. These findings imply lower diversification benefits which 
Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) have argued could be due to possible cross selling 
of different products to the same customers.   
Smith and Wood (2003) examine the variability of interest and non-interest income, and the 
correlation between these two variables, for the banking systems of EU countries for the period 
1994-1998 and in the process arguing that non-interest income reduces bank risk via 
diversification. They found the increased importance of non-interest income to stabilise profits 
in the European banking industry in those years. Further, Canals (1993) found that the increased 
revenues obtained from new business units have significantly contributed to improving bank 
performance. Focusing on the impact of non-interest income on bank profitability, Saunders 
and Walters (1994) argue that fee-based income stabilises profitability. This was also supported 
Uppal (2011) who argues that after reforms banks have start to enter the financial market with 
almost daily innovative products/services to capture maximum market share and then earn 
maximum profits. Uppal (2011) argue that the combination of banking, insurance and securities 
activities may lead to a more stable profit stream since the revenues stemming from different 
products in a conglomerate organisation are usually imperfectly correlated.   
 In another strand of research, Mester (1992) found that mixing traditional banking activities of 
originating and monitoring loans with non-traditional activities of loan selling and buying 
products does not only lead to economies of scale but also diseconomies of scope. Further, 
researchers Kwast (1989), Mishkin (1999), Chow and Surti, (2011) and Hale and Santos (2009) 
argued that the shift from traditional banking to non-traditional banking where banks borrow 
short, lend long and hold on to loans as an investment has been reshaped by increased 
competition and innovation after the deregulation of banking in 1986. Deregulation which 
aimed to increase competition and profitability of banks dramatically changed characteristics 
of the bank balance sheet, from the types of assets bank hold to how they fund themselves to 
the source of bank income.  
 Bord and Santos (2012) provide an account of how banks adopted the originate-to-distribute 
model in their corporate lending business and provide evidence of the effect that this shift has 
had on the growth of nonbank financial intermediation. Thus, the originate-to-distribute model 
has changed the credit intermediation as these functions now occur less on bank balance sheets 
and more in capital markets. As the profitability of traditional banking activities has, for a wide 
variety of reasons, come under pressure in recent years, fee-earning activities have greatly 
increased their contribution to bank profits. Further, Lepetit et al, (2007) indicated that as a 
result of deregulation and the adoption of universal banking principles commercial banks can 
compete on a wider range of market segments. Additionally, Hale and Santos (2009) are of the 
view that banks no longer hold the loans they generate and originate as investment but sell these 
loans to brokers to get liquidity and increased fee income. However, these in turn pool banks 
to issue securities which are distributed to a range of investors with a different set of risk 
characteristics. Thus, with the shift to noninterest income came a different set of risk 
characteristics that pose a threat to financial stability as was witnessed in the 2007-2010 
financial crisis (Griffiths, 2011).  
An alternative way of viewing the banks’ shift to non-traditional banking activities is by looking 
at the size of the banks’ balance sheet in relation to the balance sheets of other financial 
intermediaries (Edwards and Mishkin, 1995). In this context, a reduction in balance sheet size 
is observed. However, as argued by Boyd and Gertler (1994) and later by Edwards and Mishkin 
(1995) the reduction in bank balance sheet size of the banking industry is not an indication of 
a decline in banking industry but an increase in off-balance-activities. This is in support of 
Kaufman and Mote (1994) and Smith and Wood (2003) who argue that the banking industry is 
not actually declining in any meaningful economic sense; rather, the nature of its intermediation 
activity is changing and is now dominated by the originate-to-distribute model.  
A further issue to consider in relation to changing bank income structure is the issue of 
measurement. The measurement of the shift from traditional banking activities to non- 
traditional banking activities is not clear cut. Edwards and Mishkin (1995) argue that the 
standard measures of profitability such as pre-tax rates of return on assets and equity do not 
provide a clear trend in bank profitability as overall bank profitability includes increasingly 
important non-traditional business of banks. This paper build on Edwards and Mishkin’s (1995) 
study and Davies and Tuori’s (2000) argument that the income structure is considered to be a 
particularly fruitful area to look for indications of changes in the nature of the banking industry. 
 We use the crude measure of profitability where we single out noninterest income from total 
earnings since much of this income comes from non-traditional activities.   
From a bank safety and stability perspective, numerous studies have investigated the 
implications that the adoption of universal banks have on bank risk, the safety and soundness 
of the banking system as well as the implications for the supervisory authorities (See: De Young 
and Roland, 2001; Stiroh and Ruble, 2004). Stiroh and Rumble (2006) argue that when banks 
move into fee income earning activities, sometimes the diversification gains are more than 
offset by the costs of increased exposure to volatile activities and this represent the dark side 
of diversification and this has implications for supervisors, managers, investors and borrowers. 
However the authors argue that in the US banks are now aware of the limitations of the 
expansion into non-traditional banking activities and are reverting back to the core banking 
competencies and in the process avoiding products that adversely affect their bottom line.  
While much work has been done on the decline of traditional banking and the analysis of 
interest income and noninterest income in the US, this is the first study in the UK to examine 
the interest income and noninterest income trends that covers the periods since the 1986 
deregulation as well as the recent financial crisis. We also follow Edwards and Mishkin’s 
approach although several important features differentiate the current paper from earlier work 
analysing the trend from a different viewpoint. We use large UK bank financial statement data 
from 1986 up to 2012. We notice a significant shift from interest income to non-interest income 
beginning from as early as 1999 for some banks. We conduct a correlation analysis which 
enables us to capture the correlation between interest income and non-interest income for the 
period of our study and focus on the risk implications for the regulators and the banking 
industry at large.   
Data, Methodology, and Sample  
The empirical analysis uses data on revenue sources for UK bank and bank holding companies 
(BHCs). This section defines the key variables in the analysis and provides some discussion of 
their relevance and importance. The current study focuses on five major British banks namely, 
HSBC, Royal Bank of Scotland, Lloyds, Barclays, and NatWest. We utilise data from annual 
reports including balance sheet and income statement. Our choice of these banks is based on 
the fact that they play an essential role in the economy of the UK and contribute a huge 
percentage in the GDP of the country. The sample data is from 1986 to 2012 with 19861 as our 
starting point as it was dubbed as “Big Bang” when the deregulation of financial markets 
allowed banks to expand their activities in order to increase competition, innovation and 
profitability. Our main focus is to critically analyse the changes in interest and non-interest 
income thereby providing an account of the changes in the income structure in the banks as a 
result of the deregulation and tease out the contribution that these changes have had to bank 
performance and systemic risk compared to a period when banks only focused on traditional 
banking interest income activities.   
Empirical results   
                                                 
1 RBS and Natwest only started reporting non- interest income in 1994 and 1992 respectively  
 Broad Overview  
The main aim of this study is to investigate the changing bank income structure with particular 
emphasis on interest income and noninterest income for the 5 large UK banks. Although the 
data indicate that UK banks increasingly shifted from traditional banking from as early as1986, 
we find this trend more significant from 1999. In 1986, the first year of our sample, the banks’ 
non-interest income was £2265 million. However, in 2007, non-interest income had risen to 
£9548 million. By 2008 however as a result of the financial crisis, non-interest income had 
fallen to £5659 million. The interest and non-interest income trends for the period 1986-2012 
are shown in Figure (1) below.   
  
Figure 1. Interest and noninterest income of UK banks from 1986-2012  
As shown in Figure (1) the noninterest income for the period 1986-1988 increased due to 
deregulation of banking sector by the Thatcher government to increase competition and 
profitability as banks which were not reporting the noninterest income started reporting the 
income from 1986. As Davies and Tuori (2000) highlighted, noninterest income is associated 
with more volatile bank returns which is observed in 1989 when the banking sector faced a 
downturn hence the noninterest income fell by 50% in 1991. The trends indicate that banks 
significantly diverted attention towards diversifying and investing in non-interest generating 
activities over the period as illustrated by Figure (2) which shows the proportion of interest and 
non-interest income operating profit of banks.  
   
Figure 2. Proportion of Interest income and non-interest income in operating income  
On an individual bank basis Lloyds stands out when compared to other banks. HSBC and RBS 
show an upward movement however NatWest and Barclays shows a stable upward movement 
from 1986-2012 as shown in Figure (3) Appendix A.  
In contrast, a significantly stable trend was observed in the banks’ interest income. The interest 
income for Lloyds was lower compare to the noninterest income trend as seen above in Figure 
(3 & 4) in appendix. RBS shows completely different troughs although compare to HSBC as 
these two banks display similar trends in non-interest income.   
The results are in support of Brunnermeier et al, (2012) who indicated that banks with high 
interest income contribute more to systemic risk than banks with lower interest income. Our 
analysis reveals a similar trend as banks with higher noninterest income such as Lloyds had 
major losses during the financial crisis 2007-2008. Banks, after the deregulation act in 1986, 
moved from their traditional role where short term funds and lending occurred on bank balance 
sheet and loans were held on to as an investment. This meant that the systemic risk that were 
impossible to diversify were hedged by the liquid assets but in originate to distribute model of 
banking banks started to sell those loans and then securitized in asset backed securities, and 
might even re-securitised and these were held off-balance sheet. The main argument by Bord 
and Santos (2012) is when banks became more involved in originate to distribute model which 
allowed credit risk to be sliced, diced and dispersed but allowed them to earn fee income 
however, that exposed banks to systemic risk.  
Non-interest income increased by only 8.37% in 1999 however a 39% increase in 2001 is 
observed, this is when non-interest income became a major source of income for banking 
sector. Moreover, in 2003 the noninterest income increased by 48% as compare to 2001. The 
noninterest income followed an increasing trend up to 2007 as compare to interest income 
which was increasing but at a decreasing rate. Thus we observe that noninterest income 
increasingly became the major source of income for banks.   
 Following the increasing trend up to 2007 the results of the analysis show a significant 
downturn in the non-interest income consequent of the 2007-2010 financial crisis. The 
noninterest income fell by 41% from £9548 million in 2007 to £5659 million in 2008. In 
contrast, the interest income increased by 18% from 2007-2008 but decreased by 9.5% from 
2008-2009. This justifies ECP (2000) argument that non-interest income does not seem to be 
less volatile than interest income. The selected bank non-interest income is predominantly 
securities income and other income where the income from securities is more volatile than fee 
and commission income. The reason behind the decrease in interest income was due to the fact 
that the mortgage products were rapidly being pulled from the market due to losses on loans 
bad debts being written off which reduced the interest earned on the mortgage. The volatile 
nature of non-interest income pushed it to fall rapidly during this time.   
 As indicated by literature above some of the changes in bank income structure were due to 
technological changes as well as financial processes. Due to the 2007-2010, financial crisis 
consumer confidence fell to a record low and in the process reduced consumer demand for 
loans which ultimately reduced banks interest income as from 2008. As highlighted by Edwards 
and Mishkin (1995) and later by Bord and Santos (2012) the increase in originate to distribute 
function of banks and declining role of banking in traditional financial intermediations is based 
on comparison of the bank balance sheet size relative to other financial intermediaries. 
However, as argued by Boyd and Gertler (1994) the decline in the share of total financial 
intermediary assets does not indicate that the banking industry is in decline but a switch to the 
non-traditional banking activities.   
Interest income and Noninterest income trends for individual banks  
Traditionally, fee income or non-interest income was a small part of the earnings stream of 
most banks. However, the earning stream in banks is affected by changes in other factors such 
as interest receivable, payable and expenses, the effect of these are discussed in relation to 
Lloyds (see: Figure (3) in Appendix).   
The non-interest income in Lloyds was greater than interest income in 1986 and remained 
higher until 1988 where interest non-income was £687.5 million and interest income was 
£192.6 million (Appendix Figure 5). The decline of interest income is not unique to Lloyds, 
but was due to the banks being hard hit by the recession from 1988-1992. Moreover, a drop in 
both interest and noninterest income can be seen from 1989-1994 when the banking sector was 
in turmoil during the LTCM crisis. A major event in the shift from traditional activities for 
Lloyds bank is noticeable with the increase in noninterest income that follows the merger with 
Abbey Life in 1988. This brought about a slight increase in both interest income and 
noninterest. In 2000 the bank acquired Scottish Widows (a mutual life assurance company). 
This made Lloyds the second largest UK provider of life assurance and pensions. Scottish 
Widows contributed an income of £403m as of March 2000.Consequent of the purchase the 
group fee income increased to 46% of total income compared to 40% of 1999.In the same year 
the bank purchased Chartered Trust from Standard Chartered to form the Lloyds TSB Asset 
Finance Division which provides motor, retail and personal insurance under the name Black 
Horse.  
 Consequently income contribution from insurance and investments rose to 34% of total income.  
Hence the upward trend in noninterest income continues to be noticeable. In 2004 the 
noninterest income was 75% higher than interest income. This increase in noninterest income 
was due to an increase of £26 million in fee and commission receivable which relate to a wide 
range of services provided throughout the group.   
As a result of the investment in Scottish Widows and the operations of Black Horse the bank 
witnessed a significant increase in noninterest income for the period 2000-2004. This was 
backed by a strong growth in income from insurance broking, card services and other short 
term investment. The interest income comparatively is showing a stable trend over the period 
however, as Hale and Santos (2009) argued the noninterest income is more stable than interest 
income and fee based activities reduce bank risk via diversification. The increase in non- 
interest income is also due to increased bank investment on other financial instruments rather 
than just making loan to customers.   
For Lloyds in relation to the changes on the balance sheet flowing through to the income 
statement the results of this study show that with a decrease in the percentage of loan to 
customers as a proportion of total assets came an increase in the noninterest income for the 
bank. This trend is observed for the period from 1996-2007. However, a totally different trend 
is observed during the 2007-2010 financial crisis when the percentage of loan decreases due to 
reduced demand of loans. Thus the interest and noninterest income both declined due to low 
demand of loans and other marketable securities and the bank writing off loan losses.   
With regard to the relationship between increase in non-interest income and bank profitability 
of particular significance is HSBC where the increased revenue obtained from ‘new’ HSBC 
businesses increased the profitability of the bank. As illustrated by Figure (7) (Appendix). The 
bank started with a balanced mix of interest and noninterest income from 1988 where the 
interest income was £1721 million and noninterest income was £1137 million. Although non-
interest earning activities slightly decreased during 1991-1996 when the banking system in the 
UK was facing a downturn HSBC’s interest income in the 1987 reflects a high level of average 
assets and the interest margin of the bank was slightly higher than 1986 due to improved interest 
spread and increased proportion of mortgage loans. Despite the flat tariff structure in the UK 
in 1987, HSBC’s noninterest income increased by 12.5% due to growth in banking 
commissions.   
HSBC continued to expand the insurance and trust business which leads to increased 
commission income. Interest income in 1991 grew by £1757 million as compared to £1643 
million in 1990 while noninterest income increased by 5% from 1990-1991. These results are 
in support of Gallo, Apilado and Kolari (1996) found that the high proportion of mutual assets 
of banks holding companies over the period of 1987-1994 was associated with increased 
profitability and reduced risk for bank holding companies.  
Dealing profits increased due to increased securities trading profit. The trading profit, fee 
income and commission increased with growth in First Direct, cards and Griffin Factors. The 
noninterest income in 1997 was 8% higher than interest income which decreased to 4% in 
 1998.After 1998 HSBC’s fee income grew from £1275 million to £1488 million in 1999 
reflecting strong wealth management activities. In 2001, the interest income increased to £3325 
million from £2716 million in 2000 due to growth in personal and commercial current account 
saving and lending in the UK banking. The non- interest income in 2000 was also increasing 
due to strong growth in global safe custody fee, higher current account and overdraft fee and 
increased corporate banking fee. Noninterest income in HSBC UK banking was driven by an 
increase of 16% in life, pension and investment income and 7% increase in general insurance 
income.  
HSBC derived an increasing share of their profit from off-balance sheet activities such as fee 
income, commission, insurance and other trading activities. As a share of total bank income, 
the noninterest income increased from 42%, in 1990 to 48% in 1991. A declining trend can be 
observed in bank’s interest income and the declining trend in profitability of bank’s traditional 
business becomes evident with the noninterest income stable over the period until it takes a 
slight downturn from 89% to 69% observed in 2008-2009. The decline in interest income was 
attributable to lower yield on excess liquidity and customer lending partly offset by reduction 
is cost of funds on customer accounts.   
When compared to Lloyds and HSBC, NatWest shows a different story with noninterest income 
in NatWest higher than interest income from 1992 through to 2000 as shown in Figure (9) 
(Appendix). The income trend for NatWest is stable as compare to that of HSBC and Lloyds. 
This may be due to what Mishkin (1999) labelled as financial innovation and deregulation that 
created attractive alternatives for both depositors and lenders and banks as well. After the 
deregulation period NatWest doubled the share of their income from off-balance sheet, 
noninterest income activities. However, the bank only started to report the interest income and 
noninterest income in their financial reports from 1993. However, a review of the banks’ annual 
statements and augmentation2 with other information shows that the interest income of the bank 
accounted for 62% of total income in 1988 and the steady increase in income is not only from 
increased volume of business but effective management of interest rate exposure during the 
period when interest rates have fluctuate significantly. In the same breadth noninterest income 
grew by 68% since 1984 and kept pace with the increase in interest income over the same 
period.   
In 1990 interest income increased by 3% while noninterest income rose by 9% despite the 
downturn in economic activities in major markets of the group. Commission income which is 
the main component of noninterest income rose by 16%. Although the investment banking 
business of NatWest was affected by the deterioration in world stock markets and the UK 
economy in 1993 noninterest income of the bank benefited from the launch of National 
Westminster Life Assurance (NatWest Life) and increased popularity of card and electronic 
payment system. In the same breadth the interest income increased due to increase in home 
loans in 1993 subsequently, fall in 1994 due to subdued loan demand. Overall, interest and 
noninterest income trends were largely stable over the period of 1995-2005 however a 
                                                 
2 Augmentation with the directors reports  
 significant decrease can be observed in 2008-2009 when the noninterest income falls from 
£5397million to £3197million.   
Generally, for the period of 1986-2012, noninterest income in NatWest was 51% of total 
income which is higher than interest income which constituted only49%. The increase in 
noninterest income is due to increased engagement in unlimited derivatives activities, and other 
debt and equity securities as shown in Figure (10) in Appendix.   
The asset side of NatWest balance sheet shows that the bank invested a significant amount of 
funds in debt securities other investing assets include derivatives, equity securities, and dealing 
assets as shown above in Figure (10) in Appendix. For NatWest the results of the research are 
in support of Edwards and Mishkin (1995) reported that banks have increased their 
participation in derivatives markets dramatically in the last few years. They further argue that 
these derivatives are held by large banks primarily to facilitate their dealings and trading 
operations. This increased participation of banks in derivatives markets has been a concern for 
both regulators and legislators because derivative will enable banks to take more risk than is 
prudent. Researchers (Kashia, Rajang and Stein, 2002, Mishkin, 1999) argue that such activities 
are riskier than traditional banking activities and could threaten the stability of the entire 
banking system. Further, as argued by Edward and Mishkin (1995) derivative are often 
complex instruments and need sophisticated risk control system to measure and track the 
potential exposure of bank.   
Barclays shows a totally different trend due to its huge involvement in investment banking 
operations. Figure (11) in Appendix shows the interest and noninterest income trend of 
Barclays over the period of 1986-2012. As from 1986, there was a strong performance from 
central retail services division interest income has steadily increased since 1982 by an average 
annual rate of 11%. The non-interest income increased from £1785 to £2966 in 1988 which 
was an increase of 42% where money transmission and lending fee made important 
contributions. The interest income increased to £3420 million in 1989 due to stronger balance 
sheet growth, increase in interest rate earning assets to 12% in 1987 as compare to 7% in 1986. 
It can also be argued that this increase was due to falling interest rates in both 1987 and 1986. 
Furthermore, the interest income increased in 1987 and 1988 by 11% and 8% respectively due 
to growth in lending in the domestic UK banking. The interest income came under pressure in 
the second half of 1988 due to increase in interest rates. Noninterest income improved by 15% 
in 1988 however, the contribution of noninterest income was 38% of total income compared to 
37% in 1987.   
For noninterest income, commission in particular increased by 12% in 1989. However, a drop 
in both interest income and noninterest income is observed in 1994 due to 2% reduction in 
gross fees and commission due to decline in lending fee because of lower volumes. Interest 
income in 1998 increased as compare to noninterest income due to maintained overall deposits 
and lending levels. However, a stable interest and noninterest income trend is observed till 2012 
with a slight drop in noninterest income in 2005. Barclay’s investment banking arm was 
considered as a primary source of increase in noninterest income due to increased commodity 
products and improved performance. However, interest income remained constant in 2011-
 2012 notwithstanding the group facing a decline in interest margin due to reduced benefits from 
group structural interest rate and hedging activities.   
RBS follows a slightly different trend when it comes to interest and noninterest income from 
1994-2012 as shown in the Figure (12) in Appendix (the Figureure shows the data from 1994 
because RBS started reporting non-interest income in 1994). The interest income and 
noninterest income steadily increased over the period of 1994-2000. An increase in noninterest 
income is evident in 2003 where noninterest income is 19% higher than interest income which 
further became equal to noninterest income in 2005. From 2001-2007 non-interest income is 
significantly higher than interest income. A significant fall in noninterest income is observed 
in 2008 where noninterest income fell from £11191m in 2007 to £2348m in 2008 due to the 
financial turmoil all over the world, the demand for marketable securities reduced and due to 
increased mortgage default commission fee reduced. Total income of the bank increased by 3% 
in 2007 where interest income increased by 7% but commission payable increased by 5% to 
£1469m. The reason behind the decline in noninterest income was due to a 55% decrease in 
trading activities due to write-down reflecting the weaknesses in US housing market. The 
interest income fell by 7% to £11298m due to run off balances, high risk segment in no core 
and exit of higher margin. Additionally this is due to the fact that compared to other banks RBS 
was highly exposed to the housing market due to the nature of its operations. The noninterest 
income decreased to £10508m from £11593m in 2010.The noninterest income of the bank also 
decreased in the first quarter of 2012 which reflects lower gains in non-core income as 
investors’ confidence waned and lower international client activities. These results are in line 
with the KPMG (2012) UK banking performance report which indicates that this decrease in 
RBS’s noninterest income can also be due to decreased card transaction volume and the impact 
of exit of certain businesses from insurance businesses.   
 Overall, as indicated in literature and as discussed above, the increased importance of fee 
income at commercial banking companies is a direct result of structural changes such as 
industry deregulation. However the impact of new information technologies and financial 
innovation cannot be disregarded. The relationship between interest income and non-interest 
income is explore in more detail in the next section.  
Correlation Analysis:   
In this section we examine the correlation between interest income and non-interest income in 
UK banks after deregulation from 1986-2012 to investigate the effect of the banks shift towards 
non-traditional banking activities which have resulted in significant increase in noninterest 
income. The first table present the descriptive statistics while table 2 presents the results of the 
regression.   
Table 1. Summary statistics  
Variable  Mean  Std. deviation  
 Interest Income  3545619382.716 1987398802.739  
Non-Interest 
income  
3851142777.778 2190002242.222  
  
The correlation between interest and non-interest income is displayed in table (2) below  Table 
2. Correlation matrix (Pearson)  
Variables  Interest Income 
Non-Interest 
income  
Interest Income  1  0.941  
Non-Interest income 0.941  1  
  
 
  
Figure 13. Correlation between interest and non-interest income  
The results of this study indicate that for the UK banks interest income and non-interest income 
are highly positive correlated. The correlation indicates that a unit increase in interest income 
increases the non-interest income by 0.941 units. This high correlation between selected 
variables shows that the major UK banks are shifting predominantly from interest income to 
non-interest income. The non-interest income is increasing and at the same time interest income 
is increasing at a decreasing rate. It is difficult to explain these results but a possible explanation 
may be that banks may be changing the way they conduct traditional banking activities 
consequent of the increased competition from other non- banking institutions, building 
societies and finance house after deregulation which increases interest income. In this context 
to meet this competition banking sector was required to be re-oriented to be in tune with global 
market and consumer demands. Hence in order to meet the challenges of competition from non-
banking financial institutions, banks have started to restructure their business and in the name 
 of innovative products started selling the loans by packaging them through securitisation which 
ultimately adds to non-interest income. This supports the views shared by Uppal (2011).   
The non-interest income is composed of many possible income streams such as fee income, 
commission and the returns on trading assets which could increase even if banks are focusing 
more on traditional role of borrowing and lending. Our results are in support of DeYoung and 
Rice (2004) who suggested that banks earn non-interest income by producing both traditional 
banking services and non-traditional financial services. In relation to diversification and the 
lower diversification benefits our results are in support of Stiroh (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble 
(2006) who argue that argued the correlation between interest and non-interest income could 
be due to possible cross selling of different products to the same customers. We argue that with 
regard to UK banking universal banking principles does not only reflect diversification into 
non-traditional banking activities but also a shift in the way banks earns money from their 
traditional banking activities. Our results show that banks derive non-interest income not only 
from traditional charges such as checking and cash management but from new sources such as 
cash withdrawal, bank account management and insurance provision on banking products, 
online bill payment and underwriting. These results are in line with DeYoung and Rice 
(2004:35) who also found ‘‘payment services-one of the most traditional of all banking 
services- remain the single largest source of non-interest income at most US banking 
companies’’. The evidence from this study suggest that banks are earning non-interest income 
from both traditional banking activities and new non-traditional banking business. Hence, there 
is a positive correlation between interest income and non-interest income.  
Final Remarks and conclusion  
The objective of this study was to analyse the risk implications of the UK banks’ shift towards 
non-traditional banking activities. On the basis of the chosen parameters the study concludes 
that interest income though increasing: it is increasing at a decreasing rate and non-interest 
income is rising since (the Big Bang) deregulation in 1986.What became evident from this 
research is that banks do more than intermediate between depositors and borrowers: they are 
not limiting themselves to simply earning net interest margins but they have moved to be 
‘stylized general financial supermarkets’ with the adoption of universal banking principles as 
evidenced by the remarkable increase in non-interest income. Significant increases in non-
interest income were not only made possible by deregulation in 1986 but as argued by DeYoung 
and Rice (2004) for some banks increases in non-interest income were also made possible by 
advances in information technology, communication channels and financial processes.  
Our study of the change in banks’ focus from traditional activities to non-traditional activities 
yields a number of significant findings. Firstly, the present study, makes several noteworthy 
contributions to the literature. On the data side, we examine the consolidated bank holding 
company (BHC), rather than the subsidiary bank. Secondly, the correlation proved that banks 
are fulfilling the requirements of regulators to focus on traditional banking by generating 
interest income however, the positive association between interest and non-interest income 
proves that banks are still more interested in generating diversified income streams rather than 
focusing on traditional banking methods of income generation.   
 Further, the results of the study indicate non-interest income is much more volatile than interest 
income from our global view point and for each individual bank. We also found that interest 
income increases while non-interest income also increases as evidenced by the results of the 
regression. Possible explanation for these results is: UK banks shifting the way they make 
money from traditional banking activities. Another possible explanation for these results is that 
UK banks subsequent to the financial crisis and the government rushing them to lend are still 
generation a substantial amount of non-interest income by using non-traditional methods to 
produce traditional banking. These thoughts are also shared by DeYoung and Rice (2004) who 
argue that in the traditional banking model loan servicing fees and securitisation do not exist, 
as banks originate these loans in their own portfolios and service these loans themselves. We 
extend the work of DeYoung and Rice (2004) and argue that banks should not be using their 
loan books to generate non-interest income from customer deposits as this exposes banks to 
systemic risk. Our argument is based on Boyd and Graham (1986) who earlier on ( even before 
deregulation) found that banks’ increased activity in non-traditional banking activities 
increased the risk of failures during less stringent policy periods in the 1970s.   
The trends documented in this article have important implications for banks and the regulators. 
Banks’ increasing diversification to non-traditional activities has implications for financial 
stability and exposes the industry to systemic risk. While banks may respond to their shrinking 
intermediary role and diminished profitability by taking greater risk, if this goes unrestrained, 
it could undermine the stability of the banking system. The financial crisis provided some 
evidence that banks have in fact increased their risk-taking, either through riskier strategies in 
their traditional business lines or by seeking out new and more risky activities which left the 
whole banking industry exposed to greater systematic risk. In the process, this scenario has 
contributed to the growth of financial intermediation outside the banking system, including a 
larger role for unregulated “shadow banking” institutions (Piciu et al., 2011). A constructive 
regulatory approach by the regulator has been to adopt a system of structured bank capital 
requirements together with early corrective action by regulators. However this only works if 
bank risk exposures have been measured accurately and capital requirements be set high 
enough to deter excessive risk-taking and for the regulator to adapt their policies to the new 
financial environment. This strategy, we believe, can successfully keep in check excessive risk-
taking by banks while providing the flexibility for both banks arid regulators to restructure the 
banking system in order to achieve greater long-term stability. In the UK this is developing in 
the form of Independent Commission of Banking’s report key recommendation: ring-fencing 
retail operations. Based on our results, we support this contention in the perspective of the UK 
banking industry and argue the loan portfolio and the investment portfolio should be kept 
separate. These arguments form the basis of future research.  
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